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INTRODUCTION 
 
Thirty-two National Football League (NFL) teams battle one 
another each week, but each of these teams has at least one thing in 
common—Reebok, Inc., (“Reebok”) manufactures all of the uniforms 
worn during play, all of the hats and jackets worn on the sidelines, and 
each coach’s shirt, from Mike Holmgren’s polo shirt in Seattle to Bill 
Belichick’s hooded sweatshirt in New England. This is due to a 
trademark licensing agreement that the NFL entered into with Reebok 
in 2000.1 At first blush, this arrangement might seem like a clear 
example of one of the great potential evils in American commerce—a 
monopoly. Further review of the situation (and litigation) has 
determined that it is not. 
The primary goals of antitrust law are to protect American 
commerce from “restraints, monopolies, price-fixing, and price 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2009, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A. 2006, Creighton University. 
1Richard Sandomir, Reebok Strikes Exclusive Deal with N.F.L., L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 20, 2000, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2000/dec/20/business/fi-2360. 
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discrimination”2 and to create a more efficient economy.3 Antitrust 
law exists to prevent companies from restraining trade through 
formation of trusts,
the 
                                                
4 conspiracies,5 and monopolies.6 These words are 
not defined in the Sherman Act itself, but according to Merriam-
Webster’s Online Dictionary, “monopoly” means “exclusive 
ownership through legal privilege, command of supply, or concerted 
action,”7 a “trust” is “a combination of firms or corporations formed 
by a legal agreement,”8 and “conspiracy” is the act of “join[ing] in a 
secret agreement to do an unlawful or wrongful act . . .”9As these 
definitions indicate, it is wrong to assume a Sherman Act violation at 
any time that there is only one competitor in a market. One example of 
a legal single-competitor market is the market for NFL-licensed 
apparel, which the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled not to be 
illegally monopolized by Reebok in American Needle Inc. v. National 
Football League.10 
This article explains why the NFL’s exclusive licensing agreement 
with Reebok is considered legal and not a violation of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act. This article is divided into four parts. Part I provides a 
look at the origins behind and the history of antitrust legislation in the 
United States. Part II discusses the rise and fall of the intra-enterprise 
 
2 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
3 Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1982). 
4 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at § 2. 
7 Monopoly – Definition from Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Monopoly (last visited December 2, 
2008). 
8 Trust – Definition from Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Trust (last visited December 2, 2008). 
9 Conspiracy – Definition from Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Conspiracy (last visited December 2, 
2008). 
10 American Needle Inc. v. National Football League, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 
2008). 
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conspiracy doctrine in American antitrust jurisprudence. This doctrine 
provided that a parent company and its wholly-owned subsidiary could 
satisfy the requirements of a conspiracy that could unlawfully restrain 
trade under the Sherman Act. Had this doctrine not been overturned by 
the Supreme Court in Copperweld Corp. v. International Tube Corp., 
which ended forty years of existence for the intra-enterprise 
conspiracy doctrine, the NFL’s exclusive licensing agreement would 
likely not have been upheld by the Seventh Circuit. Part II also details 
the Copperweld decision and describes how the Copperweld decision 
has been expanded in the twenty-four years since the court decided 
Copperweld. Part III explains the facts behind American Needle Inc. v. 
National Football League and details the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
that case. Finally, Part IV provides analysis of the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision and explains why the court made the right decision. 
 
I. ANTITRUST LEGISLATION 
 
There are five main statutory bases for federal antitrust law in the 
United States.11 These are the Sherman Act of 1890, the Clayton Act 
and the Federal Trade Commission Acts of 1914, the Robinson-
Patman Act of 1936, and the Celler-Kefauver Amendments to the 
Clayton Act of 1950.12 This section of the article will focus on the 
Sherman Act, as American Needle Inc. v. National Football League 
does not contain any claims made under any of the other four acts.13 
                                                 
11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 49 (2d ed. 1999). 
12 Id. at 49 n.17. The first antitrust act, the Sherman Act, is discussed further in 
this article. The Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act were largely 
aimed at deterring large businesses from engaging in “exclusionary” practices with 
respect to smaller businesses. Id. at 49. The Robinson-Patman Act made it unlawful 
to discriminate between purchasers via price if that discrimination resulted in 
reduced competition. Id. at 571–72. The Celler-Kefauver Amendments strengthened 
the Clayton Act’s anti-merger provisions. Id. at 49. 
13 See American Needle, 538 F.3d 736. 
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The Sherman Act was debated and passed in 1890, and at that 
time, most Americans lived in rural areas rather than in cities.14 
Economies around the world had been very dependent on agriculture 
during the eighteenth century,15 and the United States was no 
exception.16 American farmers were very independent, often living 
alone on their land outside of towns and villages17 and generally only 
working together during the harvest.18 
This fiercely independent spirit of the American farmer was 
understandably shocked by the Industrial Revolution during the 
second half of the eighteenth century.19 Rural Americans felt 
threatened by the economic power wielded by large firms such as 
railroads. These feelings were only exacerbated by the eventuality that 
these workers became dependent on the new, big companies to provide 
them with machinery needed to farm more effectively and with the 
transportation infrastructure to move what they produced.20 
There seemed to be only two options—Americans could either 
live with the increasingly large corporations or rely on the government 
to take over the corporations.21 Neither option proved attractive 
because Americans were largely as skeptical of the government as they 
were of large corporations.22 As a result, a third option materialized, 
which encouraged breaking up monopolies rather than having the 
government assume control.23  
                                                 
14 LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: 
AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 4 (2d. ed. 2006). 
15 See id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 5. 
4 
4
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 2
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol4/iss1/2
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 4, Issue 1                           Fall 2008 
 
This new wave of thinking produced the Sherman Act. The 
Sherman Act relies on two main provisions.24 Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act makes it unlawful to contract or conspire in such a way 
as to restrain trade.25 Section 2 of the Sherman Act goes a step farther 
and makes it illegal for a company to monopolize or even to attempt to 
monopolize.26  
Section 1 and Section 2 were both written using very broad terms, 
which leaves the statute open to interpretation by judges.27 The broad 
language employed by the Sherman Act has achieved its goals. The 
path of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine provides a perfect 
example of courts not only being able to interpret the Sherman Act 
broadly but also being able to reverse course when they deem it 
necessary.28 
 
II. INTRA-ENTERPRISE CONSPIRACY DOCTRINE 
 
There is no language in the Sherman Act that says that two 
companies that are affiliated may avoid antitrust liability if they 
combine their efforts to compete. A literal reading of the Act would 
likely lead a reader to conclude that this sort of conduct should be 
prohibited. This likelihood seems even more probable when a statute 
is written broadly and invites judicial discretion as the Sherman Act 
does. As such, there developed a line of Supreme Court cases that 
prohibited this sort of conduct. The intra-enterprise conspiracy 
doctrine was the product of Supreme Court jurisprudence that began 
with United States v. Yellow Cab Co. in 1947 and lasted until 1984’s 
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. The doctrine stated 
that even a company and its wholly-owned subsidiary can engage in 
                                                 
24 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2000). 
25 Id. at § 1 
26 Id. at § 2 
27 SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 11, at 7. 
28 See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947); Copperweld 
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
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conduct that triggers liability under the Sherman Act.29 The seemingly 
odd result of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine is that two or 
more entities can act in such a way as to restrain trade—even though 
they have the same owner and are, presumably, operating toward the 
same ends. Though arguments against the doctrine arose to the 
Supreme Court rather frequently, it was consistently upheld for just 
under forty years.30 
 
A. Creation of the Doctrine: United States v. Yellow Cab Co. 
 
In 1929, various owners of taxicab companies in Chicago, New 
York, and other cities commenced talks with the goal of merging some 
of the major cab companies.31 Morris Markin was the controlling 
shareholder of Checker Cab Manufacturing Corporation (“CCM”), 
which in turn owned 62% of the stock in Parmalee Transportation 
Company (“Parmalee”).32 Parmalee contracted with railroads and 
railroad terminal associations to transport passengers and luggage 
between the various stations in Chicago.33 Parmalee then acquired a 
controlling interest in the Chicago Yellow Cab Company, Inc. 
(“Chicago Yellow”), which owned all of the stock of Yellow Cab 
Company (“Yellow”), which owned and operated all of the Yellow 
cabs in and around Chicago.34 
The next year, in 1930, Markin incorporated Cab Sales and Parts 
Corporation (“Cab Sales”), which owned and operated all Checker 
cabs in and around Chicago with licenses held by Checker Taxi 
Company.35 Markin then acquired a large interest in DeLuxe Motor 
Cab Company—the third largest cab company in Chicago in 1929.36 
                                                 
29 See Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218. 
30 See id.; Copperweld, 467 U.S. 752. 
31 Yellow Cab, 332 U.S. at 220–221. 
32 Id. at 221. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 221–222. 
36 Id. at 222. 
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Therefore, by 1930, Markin owned the three largest taxicab companies 
in Chicago.37 Markin also had holdings in New York, Pittsburgh, 
Minneapolis, and Michigan,38 therefore creating a “large, nation-wide 
obstacle[] in the channels of interstate trade” of the sort that the 
Sherman Act is designed to tackle.39 
The United States sued Yellow Cab, Chicago Yellow, Parmalee, 
Cab Sales, Checker, CCM, and Markin, claiming violations of 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.40 Yellow Cab eventually made its 
way to the Supreme Court, and in Justice Murphy’s opinion, the Court 
held that “[t]he test of illegality under the Act is the presence or 
absence of an unreasonable restraint on interstate commerce.”41 The 
Court continued, saying “[s]uch a restraint may result as readily from a 
conspiracy among those who are affiliated or integrated under 
common ownership as from a conspiracy among those who are 
otherwise independent.”42 The Court held that “interrelationships of 
the conspirators” are unimportant in determining whether the Sherman 
Act applies to a particular situation.43 The Court then cited its own 
precedent for support of the proposition that the Sherman Act concerns 
itself with “substance rather than form,”44 meaning that for the 
purposes of the Sherman Act, what is important is that trade is 
restrained—it does not matter who does the restraining. The Court 
took a very literal interpretation of the Sherman Act and reasoned that 
neither who was restraining trade nor how the entities were related to 
one another mattered for the purposes of Sherman Act liability. As 
long as trade was restrained, a Sherman Act violation had occurred. 
Thus was born the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. 
 
                                                 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 225. 
39 Id. at 226. 
40 Id. at 225. 
41 Id. at 227. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. (citing Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933)). 
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B. Affirmation of the Doctrine: Kiefer Stewart, Timken Roller Bearing, 
and Perma Life Mufflers 
 
Issues regarding antitrust liability involving conduct between two 
related entities did not cease with the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Yellow Cab. Over the next thirty-seven years, the Court was given 
multiple opportunities to reverse course with regard to the holding in 
Yellow Cab.45 The Court held firm, however, and stood by the intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine developed Yellow Cab. 
Interestingly, many times the Court did not take the time to revisit 
the rule from Yellow Cab and did little more than cite to Yellow Cab 
(and later to the other cases that followed its precedent) without taking 
a closer look as to why the rule was implemented or why it should 
continue to be followed.46 Justice Jackson looked critically at the 
doctrine in one dissenting opinion,47 but aside from this rather isolated 
example, the justices seemingly blindly followed Yellow Cab. 
 
1. Kiefer Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. 
 
In 1950, the Court heard oral arguments in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. 
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.48 Kiefer-Stewart was an Indiana drug 
concern who also engaged in a liquor wholesaling business.49 Seagram 
and a company called Calvert were affiliated companies that sold 
liquor to Indiana wholesalers.50 Kiefer-Stewart sued, arguing that 
Seagram and Calvert had conspired to fix the prices at which they 
would sell liquor to Indiana wholesalers.51 Among the defenses raised 
                                                 
45 See, e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 
211 (1951); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); 
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968). 
46 See, e.g. Kiefer-Stewart Co., 340 U.S. at 215; Timken Roller Bearing Co., 
341 U.S. at 599; Perma Life Mufflers, Inc., 392 U.S. at 141–142. 
47 See Timken Roller Bearing Co. 341 U.S. at 606–608 (Jackson, J, dissenting). 
48 Kiefer Stewart Co., 340 U.S. 211. 
49 Id. at 212. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
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by Seagram and Calvert was the argument that because the two were 
affiliated companies, they were unable to violate the Sherman Act 
because they were actually one company and unable to conspire.52 
The Court cited Yellow Cab in declaring that common ownership 
does not “liberate corporations from the impact of the antitrust 
laws.”53 With this holding, the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine 
lived on among Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
 
2. Timken Roller Bearing v. United States 
 
Another example of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine came 
a few years later in 1951 in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United 
States.54 In Timken Roller Bearing, the United States brought a civil 
action against Timken Roller Bearing Company (Timken) for 
allegedly violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act.55 The case involved 
agreements made as far back as 1909, in which Timken made 
agreements with foreign companies to divide the world into territories 
to which the entities would provide antifriction bearings.56 The 
agreements were made between 1909 and 1927, at which point 
Timken acquired a significant portion of British Timken, Ltd. (“British 
Timken”), which entered into the territorial agreements with Timken.57 
In 1928, Timken was involved in organizing Societe Anonyme 
Francaise Timken, a French company that also provided antifriction 
bearings.58 The group then entered into agreements to “(1) allocate[] 
trade territories among themselves; (2) fix[] prices. . .; (3) cooperate[] 
to protect each other’s markets. . .; and (4) participate[] in cartels to 
restrict imports to, and exports from, the United States.”59 
                                                 
52 See id. at 215. 
53 Id. 
54 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 595. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 596. 
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Among its arguments attempting to show that the court should not 
have held that it restricted trade according to the Sherman Act, Timken 
argued that the arrangement was a joint venture, which it argued 
should exempt it from culpability under the Sherman Act.60 The Court 
disagreed with this argument and cited to Kiefer-Stewart for the 
proposition that “[t]he fact that there is common ownership or control 
of the contracting corporations does not liberate them from the impact 
of the antitrust laws.”61 
Timken Roller Bearing is significant, however, because it can be 
argued that this case is where chinks in the armor of the intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine begin to appear. Though possibly only 
intended for companies affiliated across national borders, Justice 
Jackson provided a powerful dissent, in which he argued that 
preventing American companies from creating foreign subsidiaries 
(even if each only served a particular geographical area) may prevent 
American companies from expanding into foreign markets.62 Jackson 
went on to argue that there must be two entities in order to conspire 
because “a corporation cannot compete with itself.”63 Jackson pointed 
out that in cases in which the Yellow Cab rule was applied, what would 
be legal for one company to do on its own became illegal when done 
by two legally separate entities.64 According to Justice Jackson, “that 
result places too much weight on labels”65 and “[the] decision [would] 
restrain more trade than it [would] make free.”66 
 
3. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp. 
 
Though Justice Jackson voiced his disagreement with the intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine in Timken Roller Bearing, the Court 
                                                 
60 Id. at 597. 
61 Id. at 598. 
62 Id. at 606 (Jackson, J. dissenting). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 607. 
66 Id. at 608. 
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was not precluded from upholding the intra-enterprise conspiracy 
doctrine seventeen years later when the Court heard oral arguments in 
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.67 Perma Life 
Mufflers is a notable case for two main reasons. First, the majority’s 
opinion demonstrates that any potential movement toward overturning 
Yellow Cab and abolishing the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine that 
may have begun with Justice Jackson’s dissenting opinion in Timken 
Roller Bearing had been quashed.68 Second, Perma Life Mufflers is 
important because it shows that after over twenty years, the Yellow 
Cab decision still held strongly, as none of the Nine disagreed with its 
application in Perma Life Mufflers.69 
Perma Life Mufflers involved a set of facts similar to all of the 
other cases of its ilk.70 In Perma Life Mufflers, a group of plaintiffs all 
operated muffler shops under the name “Midas Muffler Shops” 
pursuant to agreements entered into with Midas, Inc.71 The plaintiffs 
sued, claiming that Midas had conspired with, among others,72 its 
parent corporation, International Parts Corp. such that the parties had 
violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.73 International Parts Corp. 
argued that because the defendants were all part of a single business 
entity, they were legally allowed to act in concert as they had.74 The 
Court stood firm in again reaffirming the intra-enterprise conspiracy 
doctrine as it held “the fact of common ownership could not save them 
from any of the obligations that the law imposes on separate 
entities.”75 Despite being asked again how a corporation can 
                                                 
67 Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 See id. 
71 Id. at 135. 
72 The plaintiffs also alleged that Midas, Inc. had conspired with two other 
subsidiaries of International Parts Corp. and six individual defendants. Id. These 
defendants are irrelevant to the analysis of the case under the intra-enterprise 
conspiracy doctrine. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 141. 
75 Id. at 141–142. 
11 
11
Gunderson: The Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Doctrine in <em>American Needle I
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 4, Issue 1                           Fall 2008 
 
essentially collude with itself, the Court continued its bizarre line of 
jurisprudence that made it unlawful to do so even if the entities 
conspiring are held under common ownership. 
Perma Life Mufflers is also very important for a second reason. 
Any movement toward a reversal of the Court’s jurisprudence with 
regard to the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine that began with 
Justice Jackson’s dissenting opinion in Timken Roller Bearing was 
halted, as none of the justices who wrote opinions76 in Perma Life 
Mufflers even mentioned Justice Jackson’s dissent.77 Seventeen years 
had passed since Timken Roller Bearing had been decided, and 
Jackson had only been on the bench for three of those years. It seems 
apparent that his viewpoint questioning the rationale behind the intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine had failed to gain any traction, and if 
the doctrine were going to be overturned, the doctrine’s detractors 
would have to wait. 
 
C. Turning Point: Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. 
 
The Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Berger, elected to 
change course with regard to the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine 
with its 1984 decision in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube 
Corp.78 Between 1955 and 1968, the predecessor to Regal Tube Co. 
(Regal) was located in Chicago and was a wholly owned subsidiary of 
C.E. Robinson Co.79 In 1968, Lear Sigler, Inc. (Lear) purchased Regal 
and used it as an unincorporated division of Lear.80 In 1972, Regal 
was sold to Copperweld Corp. (Copperweld).81 The sale agreement 
                                                 
76 There were four separate opinions written in Perma Life Mufflers by Justices 
Black (majority), White (concurring), Marshall (concurring), Fortas (concurring in 
the result), and Harlan and Stewart (dissenting). It is noteworthy that by the time that 
Perma Life Mufflers was heard, Justice Jackson had been off of the bench for nearly 
fourteen years. 
77 See id. 
78 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
79 Id. at 756. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
12 
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contained a five-year noncompetition clause that bound Lear and its 
subsidiaries not to compete with Regal in the United States.82 David 
Grohne was one of Lear’s corporate officers and had previously served 
as vice president and general manager of Regal before Lear’s 
acquisition of Regal.83 Grohne had acted as president of Regal after it 
became a division of Lear after the acquisition.84 Soon after Regal was 
sold to Copperweld, David Grohne sought to establish himself in the 
steel tubing market against his former employer, Regal, and he 
established Independence Tube Corp. (Independence).85 Independence 
contracted with Yoder Co. (Yoder) to supply a tubing mill by the end 
of 1973.86 
Regal and Copperweld discovered Grohne’s plans and sent a letter 
to Yoder that said that Copperweld would take “any and all steps 
which are necessary to protect [the] rights under [the] purchase 
agreement and to protect the know-how, trade secrets, etc., which 
[Copperweld] purchased from Lear Sigler.”87 Yoder then voided its 
acceptance to provide Grohne with a tubing mill, which caused 
Grohne to find another company to provide him with a mill and 
delayed his entry into the steel tube market for almost nine months.88 
In 1976, Independence sued Copperweld, Regal, and Yoder under 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.89 The jury returned a verdict saying, 
among other things, that Regal and Copperweld had conspired to 
violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, but, interestingly, that Yoder had 
not been a part of the conspiracy.90 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision, noting 
that Yoder’s exoneration had left a parent corporation (Copperweld) 
                                                 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 757. 
88 Id. 
89 See id. at 758. 
90 Id. 
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and its wholly owned subsidiary (Regal) as the only entities involved 
in the Section 1 conspiracy.91 The Seventh Circuit questioned this 
result, noting that conduct similar to the facts of Copperweld would 
not give rise to a cause of action if the two parties were a parent 
corporation and an unincorporated division of the parent.92 Ultimately, 
however, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision on the basis that 
liability ensues “when there is enough separation between the two 
entities to make treating them as two independent actors sensible.”93 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the decision.94 
The Court examined the cases that provided the foundation for the 
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine and found other grounds that the 
past Courts could have used to decide Yellow Cab and Kiefer-Stewart 
in the same way in which they had already decided95 and that cases 
that followed those two seminal cases do nothing more than cite 
Yellow Cab or Kiefer-Stewart also could have relied upon other bases96 
unrelated to the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.  
The Seventh Circuit was not alone in acknowledging the strange 
conclusion that a parent company was capable of conspiring with its 
wholly owned subsidiary to restrict trade—Copperweld and Regal 
were joined by the United States as amicus curiae in asking the Court 
to overturn Yellow Cab.97 According to the Court, the chief criticism 
of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine was that too much weight is 
                                                 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 758–59. 
93 Id. at 759 (quoting Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 
310, 318 (7th Cir. 1982), rev’d, 467 U.S. 752 (1984)). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 761 (stating that Yellow Cab was distinguishable based on the fact that 
the acquisitions were themselves illegal); id. at 764 (stating that Kiefer-Stewart was 
distinguishable based on the fact that subsidiaries conspired with wholesalers other 
than the plaintiff). 
96 Id. at 765 (stating that in Timken Roller Bearing, the defendant neither 
owned a majority interest in nor controlled either of the conspirators); id. at 766 
(stating that Perma Life Mufflers could be decided on the same grounds as Kiefer-
Stewart). 
97 Id. 
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given to the fact that a subsidiary is separately incorporated, causing 
the activity of one entity to be treated as the concerted activity of two 
separate entities.98 In other words, a parent corporation could act in 
concert with a wholly-owned division of itself as long as that division 
was not itself separately established as a corporation. The Court went 
further, noting that Congress only intended the Sherman Act to be used 
on a single firm when that firm threatens monopolization99 and that 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act is not intended to apply to activity that is 
“wholly unilateral.”100 
The Supreme Court also noted that “internal agreements” of 
companies do not arouse Sherman Act suspicion because (1) a single 
firm’s officers do not pursue separate economic interests, so they “do 
not suddenly bring together economic power that was previously 
pursuing divergent goals”;101 (2) internal coordination just as likely 
results from efforts to compete as from efforts to “stifle 
competition”;102 and (3) coordination may be required for a business 
to compete properly.103 Furthermore, the Court noted its own 
precedent that if a subsidiary is an unincorporated division, then 
cooperation between it and its parent cannot violate section 1 of th
Sherman Act.
e 
do. 
, 
river.”  
                                                
104 The Court also pointed out that a parent and its 
wholly owned subsidiary have “a complete unity of interest”105 in the 
same way that a parent company and an unincorporated division 
The Court analogized that single entities, like Copperweld and Regal
are “not unlike a multiple team of horses drawing a vehicle under the 
control of a single d 106
 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 768; see also 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
100 Id. at 768 (quoting Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)). See 
also 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
101 Id. at 769. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 770. 
105 Id. at 771. 
106 Id. 
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D. Extension of Copperweld 
 
The decision in Copperweld signaled not only a large shift in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence by reversing a precedent adhered to for 
almost forty years, but also, in time, changed what arguments could be 
credibly made in front of courts with respect to single-entity issues in 
antitrust. In the years since the Copperweld decision, the “single-entity 
concept” has been extended far beyond its origins in which only a 
parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary could be declared a single 
entity.107 Now, even affiliated companies or individuals can also be 
considered a single-entity with respect to the Sherman Act, depending 
on the circumstances of the individual case.108 This extension of the 
Copperweld holding is the basis for the Seventh Circuit’s holding in 
favor of the National Football League, its member teams, NFL 
Properties, and Reebok with respect to the League’s decision to award 
an exclusive licensing contract with respect to headwear. This 
broadening of the Copperweld rule has been accomplished 
incrementally through a number of cases,109 but this article will only 
examine two other sports-related cases to demonstrate courts’ 
approaches to extending Copperweld: Chicago Professional Sports 
Limited Partnership v. National Basketball Association (Bulls II) and 
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.110 
The controversy in Bulls II arose as a result of the Chicago Bulls’ 
desire to broadcast more of their games on WGN, a “superstation” 
based in Chicago that broadcasts nationwide to cable television 
subscribers.111 During the case, the National Basketball Association 
(NBA) argued that the league should be treated as a single entity with 
                                                 
107 See id. 
108 See  Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership v. National 
Basketball Association (Bulls II), 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2006). 
109 See, e.g. Jack Russell Terrier Network v. American Kennel Club, Inc., 407 
F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2004); City of Mount Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Electric 
Cooperative, 838 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1988). 
110 Bulls II, 95 F.3d 593; Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996). 
111 Bulls II, 95 F.3d at 595. 
16 
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respect to granting rights to televise its games.112 The Seventh Circuit 
pointed out in its Bulls II decision that the NBA’s argument requires a 
decision to either treat the league as a single firm, thereby only 
applying Section 2 of the Sherman Act, or to treat the league as a joint 
venture, which would possibly invoke liability under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.113 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit did not answer this 
question, though the court did point out that courts have come to both 
conclusions.114  
Perhaps the most important statement that the Seventh Circuit 
made in Bulls II was when the court proclaimed sports to be 
“sufficiently diverse that it is essential to investigate their organization 
and ask Copperweld’s functional question one league at a time—and 
perhaps one facet of a league at a time.”115 The court also stated that a 
league may qualify as both a single entity and a joint venture at the 
same time, albeit for purposes of antitrust analysis of different aspects 
of the league.116 With this said, it is instructive to look another NFL 
case, Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.  
Brown is slightly different from the other cases analyzed in this 
article. While that case does not directly implicate either the upholding 
or the reversal of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, the Supreme 
Court did analyze whether the league constituted a single employer or 
multiple employers for collective bargaining purposes.117 The Court 
had difficulty deciding how to characterize the league and ultimately 
                                                 
112 Id. at 596. 
113 Id. at 599. 
114 See id. (“Most courts that have asked whether professional sports leagues 
should be treated like single firms or like joint ventures have preferred the joint 
venture characterization.” (citing Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994); 
North American Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982); Smith v. Pro 
Football, Inc. 593 F.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1978))); but see Bulls II, 95 F.3d at 
599 (noting that Justice Rehnquist filed a strong dissent in NFL v. North American 
Soccer League and noting also that the Fourth Circuit has concluded that the 
Professional Golf Association should be treated as one firm for antitrust purposes). 
115 Id. at 600. 
116 Id. 
117 See Brown, 518 U.S. 231. 
17 
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held that the league can be considered a “single bargaining employer” 
with respect to hiring and paying practice squad players.118 In Bulls II, 
Judge Easterbrook noted that despite the fact that the NFL is “‘more 
like a single bargaining employer’ than a multi-employer unit is not to 
say that it necessarily is one, for every purpose.”119 
Having explained the basic origins of antitrust law in the United 
States and the rise and fall of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, 
it is now instructive to apply these concepts to the case at the core of 
this article, American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League. 
 
III.  AMERICAN NEEDLE INC. V. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 
 
The National Football League (NFL) has been in existence for 
almost ninety years,120 and during its existence, the league has become 
wildly successful by almost any measure, including attendance,121 
television revenue,122 players’ salaries,123 and franchise values.124 The 
                                                 
118 A practice squad player is a player who practices with the team and can be 
used to supplement the team’s roster should one of the team’s regular players 
become unavailable due to injury or for some other reason. 
119 Bulls II, 95 F.3d at 599. 
120 American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 737 (7th 
Cir. 2008). 
121 In 2007, the NFL set a new paid attendance record with a total attendance 
of 22,256,502 including all 333 preseason, regular-season, and postseason games. 
This works out to an average attendance of 66,836. NFL Sets Attendance Record in 
2007, available at 
http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d5d8077f84d&template=without-
video&confirm=true (last visited November 12, 2008). 
122 Fox pays $4.3 billion to televise NFC games; CBS pays $3.7 billion to 
televise AFC games. These contracts are for the 2006–2011 seasons and include only 
Sunday afternoon games. The NFL also has a contract with DirecTV that includes 
the 2006–2010 seasons for the satellite provider’s NFL Sunday Ticket package. Late 
Season Games can be Moved to Sunday Nights, available at 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=1918761 (last visited November 12, 
2008). In addition to these contracts, the NFL has a contract to televise Monday 
night during the 2006–2013 seasons for $1.1 billion per year. Steve Kroner, Monday 
Night Football to leave ABC for ESPN, S.F. CHRON., April 19, 2005, at A-1. The 
league also has a six-year contract worth $3.6 billion with NBC to televise Sunday 
18 
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right to produce and market officially-licensed league apparel is the 
basis of the lawsuit brought against the league, its member teams, NFL 
Properties LLC (collectively, “the NFL defendants”) and Reebok 
International Ltd. (Reebok) by American Needle Inc. (American 
Needle).125 
The NFL is an unincorporated association of thirty-two 
individually owned and operated franchises around the United 
States.126 The NFL’s member teams play over 250 games in a given 
season, and it is these games that serve as the league’s product.127 The 
Seventh Circuit notes that although each team is an individual unit by 
itself, no team can produce the league’s product—the games—
alone.128 In this way, all of the league’s teams are inextricably bound 
together, and each team’s individual success is linked to the success of 
all of the others.129 In other words, “it makes little difference if a team 
wins the Super Bowl if no one cares about the Super Bowl.”130 As 
                                                                                                                   
night games. Joanna Weiss, NBC: Sunday Night’s Alright for Football, available at 
http://www.boston.com/ae/tv/articles/2006/07/24/ 
nbc_sunday_nights_all_right_for_football/ (last visited November 12, 2008). 
123 NFL payrolls for 2008 range between $83.6 million (Kansas City) and 
$152.4 million (Oakland). Pittsburgh’s Ben Roethlisberger is the league’s highest 
paid player, earning $27.7 million between his salary ($2.5 million) and signing 
bonus ($25.2 million). Larry Weissman, NFL Salaries ’08: Big Ben Smiling as 
Highest-Paid Player, USA TODAY, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2008-11-05-salaries_N.htm (last visited 
November 12, 2008). 
124 In 2008, Forbes Magazine found that the average NFL franchise is worth 
over $1 billion. The league’s most valuable franchise is the Dallas Cowboys, which 
Forbes estimates is worth $1.612 billion. Press Release, Forbes, Forbes Announces 
2008 NFL Franchise Valuations: League Average $1 Billion For The First Time In 
Any Professional Sport (Sept. 10, 2008) (on file with author). 
125 American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 
2008). 
126 Id. at 737. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
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such, the NFL sought to promote the trademarks of its member teams 
and the league itself as a collective whole with the intention of 
competing against other forms of entertainment rather than against one 
another.131 
As a result of this intention to compete against other forms of 
entertainment, the NFL teams created NFL Properties (Properties) in 
1963.132 Properties is given the dual responsibilities of both 
“developing, licensing, and marketing the intellectual property the 
teams own[], such as their logos, trademarks, and other indicia” and 
“conduct[ing] and engag[ing] in advertising campaigns and 
promotional ventures on behalf of the NFL and [its] member 
[teams].”133 Properties was given the power to issue licenses to 
manufacturers of different types of team merchandise and apparel, 
including flags, shirts, jerseys, and hats.134 
The last of these, the right to produce league-licensed hats, gave 
rise to American Needle Inc. v. National Football League.135 American 
Needle (American Needle) owned a license to manufacture NFL 
headwear for over twenty years.136 During this time, Properties 
allowed multiple companies to hold headwear licenses at any given 
time,137 but Properties changed its policy in 2000 and elected to 
continue on with an exclusive headwear license.138 Reebok was the 
highest bidder, was granted the license, and became the NFL’s 
exclusive provider of headwear as of 2001.139 Reebok’s exclusive 
license will not expire until 2011.140 
                                                 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 See id. 
136 Id. at 738. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
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Upon losing its license, American Needle filed suit in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.141 American 
Needle made two separate arguments. First, it argued that the 
exclusive apparel license granted to Reebok violated Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, because each individual franchise owns its own team 
logos and trademarks.142 So, when the teams charged Properties with 
awarding an exclusive apparel license and Properties granted that 
license to Reebok, the result was an illegal conspiracy “restrict[ing] 
other vendors’ ability to obtain licenses for the teams’ intellectual 
property.143 Second, American Needle argued that an unlawful 
monopoly was created when Properties granted Reebok its exclusive 
headwear license.144 According to American Needle, this monopoly 
was created in the specialized market of NFL team licensing and 
product wholesale.145 
The NFL defendants moved for summary judgment with regard to 
American Needle’s Section 1 claim, citing the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.146 The NFL 
defendants relied on the gradual extension of the rule laid down in 
Copperweld—affiliated companies can be considered a single entity in 
certain circumstances and therefore cannot violate Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act in those circumstances.147 The NFL defendants argued 
that they should be considered a single entity when promoting the 
league through the licensing of their respective intellectual property.148 
Rather than file a brief in response to the NFL defendants’ motion, 
American Needle filed a motion for a continuance under Federal Rule 
                                                 
141 American Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans Lousiana Saints, 496 F.Supp.2d 941 
(N.D. Ill. 2007). 
142 American Needle, 538 F.3d at 738. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
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of Civil Procedure Rule 56(f),149 requested an opportunity to take 
discovery on the issue of the NFL defendants’ single-entity defense, 
and listed fifty-one discovery requests.150 Following a struggle 
regarding what evidence needed to be turned over to American 
Needle,151 the district court denied the Rule 56(f) motion and granted 
the NFL defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding 
American Needle’s Section 1 claim. 
The district court’s ruling on the NFL defendants’ summary 
judgment motion was largely based on the fact that Properties was 
established in order to “promote NFL football” through collective 
licensing.152 The court concluded that these efforts to promote the 
league as a whole through collective-licensing demonstrates that the 
league and its member teams “act[] as an economic unit” and therefore 
“should be deemed to be a single entity.”153 The court used this 
analysis to find that the NFL defendants, as a single entity, are unable 
                                                 
149 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) provides, “[if] a party opposing . . . 
cannot . . . present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s opposition, the 
court may . . . order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions 
to be taken or discovery to be had. . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 54(f). In essence, the rule 
allows the non-moving party to argue to the court that it is unable to respond without 
receiving more discovery materials from the moving party. Id. 
150 American Needle, 538 F.3d at 739. 
151 The NFL defendants objected to American Needle’s requests, arguing that 
they were not limited to the defense that they had proffered. The NFL defendants did 
ultimately offer a number of documents, and the court encouraged American Needle 
to reduce the number of documents that it had requested while it reserved judgment 
with regard to the objection that the NFL defendants raised. American Needle then 
made yet more requests, causing the NFL defendants to again object. With this 
further request and objection, the district court entered an order limiting discovery to 
the NFL defendants’ single-entity defense and ordered the NFL defendants to 
produce all documents with respect to that issue. The NFL defendants complied; 
American Needle filed another motion under Rule 56(f) and made forty-nine more 
requests, many of them the same requests made earlier. The court then took this 
motion under advisement and compelled American Needle to respond to the motion 
for summary judgment. Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
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to violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act.154 As a result of this 
collective action, American Needle’s claim failed as a matter of law. 
                                                
Following its decision on American Needle’s Section 1 claim, the 
court requested that the two sides file briefs regarding American 
Needle’s other claim—that the NFL defendants had created an illegal 
monopoly under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.155 Upon receipt of the 
briefs, the court came to the conclusion that its finding with regard to 
American Needle’s Section 1 claim also caused the Section 2 claim to 
fail, because single entities, such as the NFL and its teams, can license 
their collective intellectual property to any number of licensees 
without breaking antitrust laws.156 
American Needle appealed the district court’s decision to the 
Seventh Circuit on two separate grounds: (1) the district court 
improperly denied its Rule 56(f) motion prior to granting summary 
judgment, and (2) the district court incorrectly granted the NFL 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on both its Section 1 claim 
and its Section 2 claim.157 The Seventh Circuit applied an abuse of 
discretion standard of review to American Needle’s first argument158 
and a de novo standard to its second.159 When an abuse of discretion 
standard of review is used, the appellate court must defer to the lower 
court’s findings unless the appellate court finds that the lower court 
exercised too much discretion in coming to its findings. De novo 
review means that the appellate court can look at the entire record 
from the lower court and can come to its own independent finding if 
necessary. Pursuant to these standards of error, the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed both of the district court’s findings.160 
With regard to its argument that the district court improperly 
denied its Rule 56(f) motion, American Needle claimed that the 
 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 740. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 741. 
160 Id. at 744. 
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district court allowed the NFL defendants to “control the flow of 
information” by refusing to order the NFL defendants to turn over 
documents that American Needle requested.161 American Needle 
further claimed that the district court failed to adequately explain its 
decision.162 The Seventh Circuit disagreed, saying that the court 
adequately explained itself and, thereby, did not abuse its discretion.163 
The Seventh Circuit pointed out that in order for American Needle’s 
motion to succeed, there needed to be some specific evidence that 
American Needle could have obtained that would have created a 
question of liability.164 In other words, a party cannot simply “go 
fishing” and expect the other side to be ordered to turn over any 
evidence in its possession that goes against its argument. American 
Needle argued that a single entity finding is “fact intensive,” but this 
alone cannot require the NFL defendants to turn over any additional 
evidence, because just because something is “fact intensive” does not 
mean that the required facts are not included in what has already been 
turned over.165 
The Seventh Circuit also denied American Needle’s second 
argument, finding that the district court properly granted summary 
judgment in favor of the NFL defendants.166 American Needle 
contended that the district court erred in concluding that the NFL 
defendants constitute a single entity under the rule from Copperweld, 
and so were capable of violating Section 1.167 The Seventh Circuit 
admitted that this is a question that does not have a readily-identifiable 
answer, and the court pointed out that in some instances, the single-
entity formulation seems apt, while in others, a professional sports 
league is more properly described as a joint venture among a 
                                                 
161 Id. at 740. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 741. 
166 Id. at 744. 
167 Id. at 741. 
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collection of independently-owned teams.168 The court cites to Bulls II 
in pointing out that the league is a “single source” for purposes of 
entertainment and that the teams produce “one product”—the league’s 
games.169 However, the court also cites to Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. 
in pointing out that when a person seeks employment in such a league, 
the teams act as separate entities that each have the ability to hire and 
fire their own employees.170 
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
The Seventh Circuit made a well-informed and considered 
decision in American Needle v. National Football League. In past 
cases, the idea of single-entity treatment for sports leagues has been 
considered, but it has not been accepted with respect to all questions 
and all aspects of the league.171 This represents a judicial minimalist 
viewpoint toward single-entity treatment, and courts should continue 
to follow this model, despite compelling arguments to treat sports 
leagues in other ways, such as joint ventures172 or even treating the 
individual franchises as separate, individual entities. 
The Seventh Circuit wisely elected to follow the path begun by 
more recent intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine cases and decided 
only what it had to in order to resolve this particular case. The effect 
was that the court neither over- nor under-reached while making its 
calculated decision in American Needle. Though the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision neither has a large direct impact on existing law nor created 
any new precedent to be followed by other courts, the decision in 
American Needle is important because it shows antitrust law’s 
continued evolution away from the seemingly incongruous results 
created by the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. 
                                                 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 See Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership v. National Basketball 
Association (Bulls II), 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2006). 
172 See id at 601–06 (Cudahy, Circuit Judge, concurring). 
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A. Courts Should Use Incremental Advancement of Single-Entity 
Status in Antitrust Cases 
 
Judicial minimalism is the idea that each case that comes in front 
of a court presents its own facts and its own unique questions and 
these questions should be answered with respect to that particular 
case’s facts.173 In other words, judicial minimalists hold that court 
decisions should not contain broad statements of law, but rather that 
each case should be decided individually and that law should move 
and evolve slowly and incrementally. To this point in time, the single 
entity concept has moved in this way—Copperweld began the 
movement by allowing a parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary to be 
treated as a single actor with respect to questions arising under the 
Sherman Act;174 Bulls II advances the idea that the National 
Basketball Association (NBA) could be treated as a single entity with 
respect to creating television contracts;175 Mt. Pleasant v. Associated 
Electric Co. involves an electric cooperative that was treated as a 
single firm;176 and even the Professional Golf Association (a collection
of individual players) has been treated as a sin 177
 
gle entity.  
                                                
A judicial minimalist approach to the single-entity concept will 
help protect against potentially unforeseen problems that can 
accompany unwarranted expansion of the law. For instance, the 
Seventh Circuit’s holding in American Needle and the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. demonstrate that even 
one league can raise questions that would be answered in different 
ways. In American Needle, the Seventh Circuit held that the league 
and its teams should be considered one entity with respect to 
 
173 See Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1454, 1455 (2000). 
174 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
175 See Bulls II, 95 F.3d 593. 
176 See Mt. Pleasant v. Associate Electric Cooperative, 838 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 
1988). 
177 See Seabury Management, Inc. v. Professional Golfers’ Ass’n of America, 
878 F. Supp. 771 (D. Md. 1994). 
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trademark licensing.178 However, in Brown, the Supreme Court noted 
that players coming into the league would see each team as an 
individual employer with the ability to hire and fire employees and 
sign and cut players.179 Had American Needle been decided before 
Brown, and had the Seventh Circuit made a broad pronouncement that 
the NFL and its teams are to be treated as a single entity, the issues in 
Brown likely would never have been raised and considered on their 
own merits. The court would not have been given the opportunity to 
decide the case in the way in which it did, because the court would not 
have had the discretion to be selective regarding when to treat a 
professional sports league as a single entity and when to treat it as a 
collection of individual entities. 
On the other hand, allowing courts to use their discretion to treat 
the league as a single entity in some cases and as separate entities in 
others could conceivably create confusion. Additionally, this discretion 
will create a situation in which courts often will not be able to rely on 
precedent because an independent inquiry would have to be conducted 
regarding each aspect of an entity. This inability to rely on precedent 
threatens to further burden an already busy judiciary that could benefit 
from a reduction in appeals and an increase in settlements. Despite this 
drawback, however, courts should continue to follow this path, 
because the league does not always act as either a single entity or a 
collection of separate entities at all times. This approach, while 
potentially inconsistent, is likely to produce the fairest results. 
 
                                                 
178 American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 
2008). 
179 Id. at 741 (citing Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 248–249 
(1996)). 
27 
27
Gunderson: The Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Doctrine in <em>American Needle I
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 4, Issue 1                           Fall 2008 
 
B. The NFL Should Be Considered a Single-Entity With Respect to 
Intellectual Property Licensing for Apparel 
 
The Seventh Circuit made the right conclusions while analyzing 
the NFL defendants’ argument that they should be treated as a single 
entity with respect to potential violations under the Sherman Act in 
American Needle v. National Football League. There are three reasons 
why the court made the right holding: (1) the NFL and its co-
defendants made a compelling argument that they produce one 
product, namely “NFL football;”180 (2) the NFL’s history indicates that 
it created Properties for the purpose of marketing and promoting the 
league and its product as a whole;181 and (3) the pertinent market in 
American Needle should be drawn more broadly and encompass more 
than simply “NFL apparel.” 
 
1. “NFL Football”: A Unique Product 
 
The Seventh Circuit held that the NFL and its member teams 
create a single product that can be identified as “NFL football.”182 The 
Seventh Circuit cites to several sources of very persuasive authority in 
holding that NFL football constitutes a unique product that is produced 
by the thirty-two NFL franchises and the league itself. The Seventh 
Circuit points to a Supreme Court decision in which the Court quotes 
Robert Bork’s book, The Antitrust Paradox, in which Bork creates a 
hypothetical professional lacrosse league and points out that it would 
be fruitless for the league to be held as violating the Sherman Act 
because there are no other leagues.183 The Seventh Circuit also cites to 
itself in the Bulls II decision in which it argues that “the NBA has no 
existence independent of sports. It makes professional basketball; only 
                                                 
180 Id. at 743. 
181 Id. at 737. 
182 Id. at 743. 
183 Id. (citing National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents, 
468 U.S. 85, 101 (quoting ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 278 (1978))). 
Note: Bork’s book was written before there was a professional lacrosse league in the 
United States. 
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it can make ‘NBA Basketball’ games  . . . .”184 This point about the 
NBA is a valid one, as NCAA basketball is a popular sport in its own 
right, and provides a unique experience when compared to the 
NBA.185 In much the same way, NFL Football is a product that is 
distinct from NCAA football. For example, NCAA football is 
generally played on Saturdays as opposed to Sundays, has its own 
unique championship system distinct from the NFL’s,186 and has 
separate television contracts,187 among other differences. 
Granted, NFL Football and college football are not exactly 
analogous, because the NFL features professional athletes, while (at 
least in theory) NCAA football features amateurs.188 Perhaps the most 
convincing argument that NFL Football is a unique product is that two 
rival professional football leagues, the United States Football League 
(USFL)189 and the XFL190 have been created in the past thirty years 
and the fact that neither remains in existence today demonstrates that 
neither served as a viable alternative to the NFL. 
Even leagues that were created without the intention of being a 
direct competitor to the NFL have failed. For example, in 1990, the 
World League of American Football (WLAF) was formed with the 
                                                 
184 Id. (quoting Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership v. National 
Basketball Association (Bulls II), 95 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
185 CBS signed a contract extension with the NCAA in 1999 to pay $6 billion 
for the rights to televise the NCAA basketball tournament. CBS Renews NCAA 
B’Ball, CNN MONEY, Nov. 18, 1999, http://money.cnn.com/1999/11/18/news/ncaa/ 
(last visited November 12, 2008). 
186 Bowl Championship Series, http://www.bcsfootball.org (last visited 
November 12, 2008). 
187 See Notre Dame agrees to five-year extension with NBC, ESPN, June 19, 
2008,  http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=3452161 (last visited November 
12, 2008).  
188 NCAA Operating Bylaw Art.12.01.1 (2008). 
189 See The History of the USFL 1982–1986, 
http://www.remembertheusfl.8m.com/history.html (last visited November 12, 2008). 
190 See C.W. Nevius, Extinct: NBC, WWF pull the plug on XFL after just one 
season of anything-goes football, S.F. CHRON., May 11, 2001, at A-1. 
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support of the NFL191 and lasted only two seasons.192 Two years went 
by before the league was resumed under the name “World League,” 
and some form of the revamped league continued on until 2007, when 
the league was disbanded.193 Even since the league went under in 
2007, the NFL has continued to play a regular season game each 
season in London,194 from which one can infer that the failure of the 
league was not due to the fact that it was football being played, but 
rather that it was not NFL Football being played. 
That NFL Football is a unique entertainment product justifies its 
treatment as a single entity in American Needle. The argument can be 
made that if the league were not treated as a single entity in some 
respects, it would be at a severe disadvantage when competing against 
other types of entertainment, such as network and cable television, the 
motion picture industry, and even popular vacation destinations, such 
as Disneyland. All of these other competitors in the “entertainment 
business” can all create their products alone, whereas NFL Football is 
only created when at least two teams are affiliated into a league and 
play one another. Furthermore, while it is conceivable that an 
individual team could fail economically, the league would likely go 
on, albeit with one fewer team. 
 
                                                 
191 History, http://worldleagueofamericanfootball.com/id23.html (last visited 
November 12, 2008). 
192 Id. 
193 The league later went by the name NFL Europe and later NFL Europa but 
still failed. NFL Folds Europe League, to Focus on Regular-Season Games Abroad, 
ESPN, June 29, 2007,  http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2920738 (last 
visited November 12, 2008). 
194 Wembley to host Dolphins & Giants, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/other_sports/american_football/6248825.stm (last 
visited November 12, 2008); NFL Chargers/Saints Wembley clash sure to be a sell-
out, Daily Mail Online, June 27, 2008,  
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/othersports/article-1029997/NFL-Chargers-Saints-
Wembley-clash-certain-sell-out.html (last visited November 12, 2008). 
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2. The NFL Created NFL Properties With the Goal of Promoting the 
Teams and the League as a Whole 
   
Judge Kanne’s Seventh Circuit opinion in American Needle listed 
this reason as being the most important for determining that in this 
case, the NFL was acting as a single entity.195 Judge Kanne noted that 
“since 1963, the NFL teams have acted as one source of economic 
power—under the auspices of NFL Properties—to license their 
intellectual property collectively and to promote NFL Football.”196 
The American Needle opinion even goes so far as to quote NFL 
Properties’ Articles of Incorporation as saying that its purpose is “[t]o 
conduct and engage in advertising campaigns and promotional 
ventures on behalf of the [NFL] and the member [teams].”197 
Therefore, as a result of forming NFL Properties in 1963, the league 
has actively engaged in a collective effort to promote and further the 
league as a whole in its efforts to compete against other forms of 
entertainment. That NFL Properties was created, coupled with the 
mission that it was given indicates that the league was aware of its 
need to raise its profile as a whole in order to compete in the 
entertainment world. 
 
3. The Market Should Be Drawn Narrowly for Analysis in Antitrust 
Cases 
 
It may seem strange, but for the purpose of an antitrust law 
analysis or other competition-related liability, such as trademark 
violations, the market analyzed can be just as important, if not more 
so, than the behavior itself that is alleged to violate the law. 
An example from the realm of trademark law is useful for the 
purpose of illustration. In Wallace International Silversmiths, Inc. v. 
Godinger Silver Art Co., Inc., the question posed was whether one 
                                                 
195 American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 744 (7th 
Cir. 2008). 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
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producer of silverware had violated the trademark of another.198 The 
Second Circuit’s decision turned, in part, on what the relevant market 
for the silverware was—the court held that the relevant market was 
that for baroque-style silverware, not silverware in general and found 
no trademark violation.199 
For the purpose of antitrust law, the analysis should be the 
opposite of that used in Wallace International Silversmiths, Inc. If the 
NFL’s single entity argument is accepted and the thirty-two NFL 
franchises are treated as a single-entity creating a single product to 
compete in the broad entertainment market, then it follows that the 
market for apparel would be similarly broadened to encompass the 
apparel of other entities. Under this analysis, Minnesota Vikings 
apparel would not be held to compete against Chicago Bears apparel; 
rather, the two would together compete against, for example, Major 
League Baseball (MLB) apparel and NBA apparel, and even licensed 
apparel for television shows and movies. 
If the NFL’s exclusive ten-year, $250 million apparel contract200 
with Reebok is any indication, there is a lot of money to be made in 
licensed-apparel. Though not exclusive like the NFL’s contract, MLB 
signed contracts in 2003 with seven apparel manufacturers collectively 
worth about $500 million over five years.201  
 
                                                 
198 Wallace International Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 
F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976 (1991). 
199 Id. at 81. 
200 Richard Sandomir, Pro Football; Reebok Strikes Exclusive Deal With 
N.F.L., NEW YORK TIMES,  http://query.nytimes.com/gst/ 
fullpage.html?res=9C0DE0D71039F933A15751C1A9669C8B63 (last visited 
November 12, 2008). 
201 Barry M. Bloom, MLB Signs New Apparel Agreements, MLB.COM, Aug. 4, 
2003, 
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20030804&content_id=460263&vkey=ne
ws_mlb&fext=.jsp&c_id=mlb (last visited November 12, 2008). 
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33 
CONCLUSION  
 
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in American Needle, Inc. v. 
National Football League, while not overly surprising given the 
trajectory of the antitrust law in the wake of Copperweld, provides a 
good example of courts resolving single entity questions as they arise 
and not making overly broad holdings that will handcuff courts in 
future situations. Courts should continue along the Seventh Circuit’s 
path and continue to develop this area of antitrust law gradually, 
without making sweeping policy holdings. 
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